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On 14 December 2001 the World Russian People's Council met to discuss the role of 
religion in a world challenged by terrorism. Such gatherings take place every year and, 
admittedly, have nationalistic overtones. In previous times, however, they focused on 
the internal relations of religion, society and the state. Now, the focus shifted to the role 
of Orthodoxy in the outside world. Patriarch Aleksy II, the president of the council, 
entered the meeting together with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In his speech, Putin emphasized the need to use "spirituality" to resist the "attempts to 
ignite a conflict of civilizations and religions." "Orthodox civilization," Patriarch Aleksy II 
said, "must become the center for adopting decisions in the world." Metropolitan Kirill 
affirmed this further: "We are able to teach many things to the restless world of today, 
for it is no coincidence that Russian culture has always inspired both East and West. ... 
We are able to offer the world a new system of interaction between nations and 
civilizations - a system based on sufficient representation of all nations in global power 
structures, on the harmonious co-existence of faiths and worldviews, on more equitable 
economic relations." Evoking the theme of the mission of the Russian nation, he added: 
"Russian... is not just an ethnic concept... it is a spiritual and cultural concept.... We do 
not possess a tenth of the financial resources of the West, ... our industry is 
experiencing a crisis as never before. But our spiritual and intellectual potential 
guarantees us a worthy place in the new world order."2
This emphasis on Russian spirituality did not constitute a startling development. In the 
new National Security Concept, Putin had linked the country's security interests in 
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maintaining the spiritual and moral welfare of the population with a need to counter "the 
adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries."3 This ominous 
phrase had an immediate practical effect, following upon earlier legislation 
discriminating against certain religious groups. Postponing the registration of Jehovah's 
Witnesses in November 2001, a Moscow prosecutor declared that the group 
represented a threat to Russia's national security.4 These developments dimmed the 
hope that mainstream Christian organizations, such as the Salvation Army, or other 
religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Pentecostals, eventually 
would manage to function freely in Russia.5
Putin's emphasis on the putative danger of "religio-cultural expansion" is noteworthy for 
another reason. It is not that he showed respect to religious tradition, but rather that he 
drew a tight connection between religion, culture and nationality and stressed its central 
role in Russian culture and social order. This approach finds fertile ground in Russia, 
which is groping for a new national concept.6
The political use of the Orthodox religion illustrates the tension between the view of the 
state as a civic institution and the vision of the state as the expression of national will. 
There are two words for "Russian": Russky refers to Russian ethnicity, while Rossiisky 
indicates Russian statehood. The Russian Church regards itself as an ethnic church. 
The Moscow Patriarchate holds the view that Russkie (ethnic Russians), regardless of 
whether they practice the faith, belong to the Russian Church, that they have their 
"roots" in Orthodoxy. This belief in the ethnic church is different from the Western 
Christian understanding of religion as the faith of individuals voluntarily united in 
religious communities and is closer to the Judaic understanding of faith, namely as the 
religion of the Hebrews. This belief may explain the Russian Church's opposition to 
foreign missionaries.
At the same time, the church regards itself as a spokesman for the narod, a term that 
signifies not only ethnic Russians but a broader social union which can include Russian 
citizens of other ethnic and national groups as well.7 It is very significant that Putin 
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habitually uses the ethnic-oriented Russky, whereas former President Boris Yel'tsin 
preferred Rossiisky. Similarly two seemingly identical concepts - narodovlastie (the rule 
of people) and democracy - have very different connotations. Narodovlastie focuses on 
the uniqueness of Russia's national and cultural heritage in the political sphere, 
including the role of Russian Orthodoxy. In this context, demokratia is a foreign word, a 
Western invention - inapplicable to the Russian realities.8
The Orthodox Church's revival that began around 1988 appears to be gaining 
momentum. 9 After several centuries of gradual secularization - from Peter the Great's 
abolition of the patriarchate to the Soviet rulers' attempts to eradicate religion from 
society - a wave of de-secularization has begun to imbue Russian political and public 
life.10 The present situation presents the church with an enormous opportunity to enter 
politics as an autonomous actor and to facilitate the formation of civil society in Russia.
Never before has it enjoyed such a degree of autonomy from secular authorities. In 
contrast to the epoch of Emperor Constantin, when the church "needed the prince's 
sword for a time," today, claims Andrei Zubov, a professor of the Russian Orthodox 
University, it is the state that needs the church for moral support.11 He suggests that the 
church enter politics and civil society at the level of the local parishes. In the present 
situation, he writes, when the population has lost practically all trust in local officials, the 
parish may preserve elections from being turned into "buying votes for two bottles of 
vodka." Instead, by a decision of the Holy Synod, the patriarchate does not allow priests 
to assume political office or support political parties, thus imposing limitations on the 
political activity of individual priests. This protects the church as an institution from being 
used by political forces and ensures that the patriarchate, as a central body, retains 
control over the political activities of the individual priests.12
Church officials encourage individual moral responsibility in the political process, an 
endeavor that can be seen as expressing the values of both Christian moral teaching 
and, potentially, modern democracy building.13 However, the lack of firm theological 
ground for an Orthodox political doctrine opens up the possibility for religious 
3
communities to enter into new democratic structures creatively, or, conversely, to resist 
such innovations by preserving old, empire-oriented Byzantine ideals.14 Hence the 
church is developing both within the framework of the legal separation of church and 
state and against it, in active opposition to the rights of other religions and with 
resistance to the autonomy of other social institutions. It is not clear which of these two 
tendencies will dominate.
This conflict became apparent in 1997 when then-President Yel'tsin revoked the existing 
legislation on religious freedom. Yel'tsin's 1997 law abolished broad legal protection for 
equality of all religions, created a hierarchy of religious organizations, and placed the 
Orthodox Church on the top of this hierarchy (affirming the church's status as Russia's 
traditional faith with all its rights and privileges preserved, while the rights and privileges 
of smaller, more recently introduced, and "foreign" religions were restricted.)15 The new 
law established a difficult registration process and opened an avenue for state 
interference into the activities of religious groups.16 While the 1990 religion law was 
viewed as establishing firm legal protection of religious freedom in Russia, the 1997 law 
appeared as a backward step.17
Many have pointed to the need to revise the present legislation on religion. Some 
suggestions have been made to improve the law's various inconsistencies and 
bureaucratic complications to make implementation easier. The Slavic Center for the 
Law and Justice, a group of professional lawyers specializing in religion and human 
rights, is among the most visible champions of the rights of religious minorities in 
Russia.18 On the opposing side are those who would recognize the Orthodox Church 
legally as the "church of the majority" or "established church" in Russia.
The concept of "established church," in this debate, does not refer to the pre-
revolutionary model of church-state relations where the church was a part of the state 
apparatus. "Church of the majority" refers to the preservation of a national idea through 
traditional religious symbols and through the development of church-based social 
organizations, in matters of charity, education and culture, similar to that performed by 
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the churches of Greece or England. Adopting the concept of the Orthodox Church as 
the church of the majority would necessitate a new legal framework of partnership 
between the state and the church - a framework that would have to express Orthodox 
ethical values in concrete policies, laws and social structures. Moreover, redefinition of 
the church-state legal relations would require that the church also redefine its traditional 
ideal of a "symphony of powers," a vague understanding of cooperation with the state, 
and come to terms with a new form of cooperation, a "social contract": concrete, 
pragmatic and unprecedented in Russian history.
There is no political force in Russia that can claim the church's full and exclusive 
support. The principle of separation from the state was expressed in the documents of 
the Holy Synod prohibiting clerical involvement in political movements, election to 
political office, and use of their ecclesiastical status to support any political party.19 The 
excommunication of the human rights activist, Father Gleb Yakunin, who offered his 
candidature for election in the Duma, served as a caution against other priests' 
involvement in political affairs. It can be viewed also as the patriarchate's restriction of 
the clergy's independent political initiative. With his excommunication, Yakunin found 
himself in the company of Lev Tolstoy, perhaps Russia's most famous moral 
philosopher. The restrictions on the activity of progressive-minded priests, such as 
Father Georgi Kochetkov,20 its hierarchism and sensitivity to "heresies" - all these 
"internal" features of Orthodoxy have been criticized sharply by liberal-minded society in 
Russia and abroad. One has to emphasize, however, that these are viewed as internal 
matters by the Church.21
Today the church presents itself as a carrier of its own "civilizational project," its own 
vision of social and political order, based on Orthodox tradition and ethics. This project 
lacks concrete mechanisms of implementation and is vulnerable to misinterpretations. 
Many analysts talk about it in terms of "empire-saving" or "empire-expanding" ideals 
(i.e., the church's assistance to the state in regaining its lost imperial power and 
resurrecting nostalgia for the lost all-embracing ideology). Thus it is claimed that after 
the glue of Marxism-Leninism dissolved, the new glue of Russian traditional religion 
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appeared to hold the society together.22 This may be true - but the church's mission in 
the world cannot be reduced to that.
It is difficult to predict in which direction the church and state will develop in terms of 
legal, political and social cooperation. This is a new and challenging situation for both - 
a search for balance between the memory of the past, respect for religion and the 
aspirations to reunite Russians around some new common ideals.
This tension raises questions about the relationship between church and state. The 
church seeks to assist the state in "reuniting" the former empire in the so-called 
"canonical territory" of the Moscow Patriarchate. 23 Such a "reunion" is based on the 
idea of common faith of persons of many nationalities and on the common canonical 
structure centered around Moscow and covering the entire territory of the former Soviet 
Union. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a part of the Moscow Patriarchate but 
independent in internal affairs. The Belorusian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox 
Church in Moldova, the Latvian and the Estonian Orthodox Churches also retain some 
independence of the Moscow Patriarchate in matters of finance and administration. 
There are dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.24 The Orthodox hierarchs agreed 
with Russian politicians on the need to defend this territory against "spiritual expansion 
of the West."25
The Russian president's alleged religiosity and the patriarch's appearance on the 
political scene are viewed with reservations, indifference and, quite often, approval. 
"The fact that the president and patriarch were sitting together," commented 
Metropolitan Kirill on one event, "says nothing special about their relations. It does not 
mean that the church is leaning on the state or that it is trying to establish a special form 
of relations with the state in order to extract some benefits for itself. One simply must 
know Russia's history. The church has always been present in the center of the life of 
the nation. This is the church's historic place."26 Such a "cozy relationship" of the 
church with the president, one might say, does not allow the church to criticize the state. 
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Yet this relationship makes possible various forms of pechalovanie (i.e., appeals by 
religious leaders to state officials for assistance to the needy). It seems that 
pechalovanie rather then political criticism would better correspond to the church's 
mission in the world and better reflect its "historic place" in the Russian society. The 
question that remains open is whether this "historic place" should be preserved in a 
passive form or modified and politically activated.
Recent survey data provide insight into public perceptions of the church's changing role. 
The participants were asked what they thought about the influence of the Orthodox 
Church on Russia's political life, whether the church's leadership had increased, 
remained unchanged or decreased in the past decade. Fifty percent of respondents saw 
an increase in the church's influence.27
The Orthodox Church's relations with the state and civil society in Russia are complex, 
dynamic and controversial. If present trends continue the state will define itself ever 
more tightly with Russian ethnicity and Russian orthodoxy. It is unlikely that in the near 
future the church will lessen its public presence. Political observers and policy analysts 
pay even closer attention to its role in the international arena and in the sphere of 
church-state relations within Russia. The church, the only surviving institution of 
Russia's tsarist past, today aspires to restore its previous might and glory and appeals 
to the current generation with the strong voice of authority and tradition. One can 
certainly disagree with what it says, but one cannot ignore its influence.
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